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SB 206: THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR
ATHLETIC EXPLOITATION
Rachel Rosenblum*
I. INTRODUCTION
College campuses are a mecca of unparalleled growth, education,
sports, and excitement for students, alumni, and fans around the
country. Millions of people gather around their televisions or stadiums
to support their favorite collegiate team, garnering billions of dollars
for their respective university and the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA).1 However, there is an insidious problem rearing
its ugly head underneath the prestige and glory of idealized collegiate
athletes and their highly competitive programs: athletic
compensation.2
Scholarships provide a means to further the goals of amateurism:
to uphold an athlete’s education, shield them from exploitation, and
protect against an unprofessional athletic environment.3 Today’s
athletic climate, however, is cluttered with big business. It is an
industry, littered with the controlling mark of large-scale commercial
* Rachel Rosenblum, J.D. Candidate 2021, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, Strategic Communication with honors, magna cum
laude, Elon University, May 2018. Special thanks to Dean Waterstone who sponsored this Note.
1. Steve Cameron, The NCAA Brings in $1 Billion a Year—Here’s Why It Refuses to Pay Its
College Athletes, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019, 7:14 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ncaacollege-athletes-march-madness-basketball-football-sports-not-paid-2019-3.
2. See generally Audrey C. Sheetz, Note, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving
Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865
(2016) (arguing a regulated form of compensation in college athletics does not diminish the studentathletes’ amateurism).
3. Id. at 871 (NCAA bylaws state college athletics are “designed to be an integral part of the
educational program.” “In line with these values, the NCAA prohibits student-athletes from
receiving compensation in order to protect them from ‘exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.’” (quoting NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL 4, 57 (2013), http://fordhamsports.com/custompages/compliace/forms/CoachComplianc
e/2013-14%20NCAA%20Manual.pdf [http://perma.cc/HT58-V46E])). See generally Caitlin D.
Buckstaff, Note, Covering the Spread: An Assessment of Amateurism and Vulnerability of StudentAthletes in an Emerging Culture of Sports Wagering, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 133 (2013)
(arguing that applying a definition of amateurism premised on the prohibition of compensation
harms rather than protects student-athletes).
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corruption, that generates a significant amount of monetary
compensation for the university and its associated entities.4
Amateurism may in fact be noble, but it does not result in fair revenue
sharing, especially for those individuals most responsible for the
profits.5 The universities, NCAA, and other marketing conglomerates
generate significant capital through the exploitation of collegiate
“amateur athletes.”6 This unethical profiteering transpires under the
veil of a system designed to prevent exactly those actions.
“The typical Division I college football player devotes 43.3 hours
per week to his sport—3.3 more hours than the typical American work
week.”7 The top twenty-four Division I schools make more than $100
million annually, with Texas A&M totaling $192.6 million in
revenue.8 Additionally, the NCAA annually makes $1 billion.9 This
massive profit is built off of the hours and hours of sweat and work
college athletes are giving to their school.10 The NCAA and individual
universities plaster images of their athletes all over campuses, social
media, and virtually all media outlets.11 In return, athletes receive only
an education, an education in which they may miss more than a quarter
of their classes and are effectively unable to work part-time.12
4. Brittany Jacobs, College Athletic Departments: The Business Behind It All, BLEACHER
REPORT (Nov. 12, 2009), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/289199-college-athletic-departmentsthe-business-behind-it-all.
5. See generally Craig Garthwaite et al., Who Profits from Amateurism? Rent-Sharing in
Modern College Sports 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27734, 2020)
(finding collegiate athletics largely bar student-athletes from sharing in revenues generated by their
participation and create substantial economic rents for the universities).
6. See generally Andy Schwarz, Mo’ne Davis and Exploiting Exploitation, VICE (Oct. 24,
2014, 4:19 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pg54p8/mone-davis-and-exploitingexploitation (arguing the NCAA’s prohibition on compensating student-athletes is “antiquated” and
cheats young athletes “out of the four best athletic earning years of their lives”).
7. Marc Edelman, 21 Reasons Why Student-Athletes Are Employees and Should Be Allowed
to Unionize, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2014, 10:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/201
4/01/30/21-reasons-why-student-athletes-are-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-unionize.
8. NCAA Finances: 2018–19 Finances, USA TODAY, https://sports.usatoday.com/
ncaa/finances (last visited Apr. 11, 2021); Steve Berkowitz, Texas A&M’s $192.6 Million in
Revenue Puts It in College Sports Elite, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2016, 2:22 PM), https://www.usat
oday.com/story/sports/college/2016/01/30/texas-a-m-joins-college-sports-financialelite/79567194/.
9. Cameron, supra note 1.
10. See Sheetz, supra note 2, at 865–66.
11. See id. at 891.
12. Edelman, supra note 7; Jon Solomon, 10 Ways College Athletes Can Get Paid and Remain
Eligible for Their Sport, CBS SPORTS (June 21, 2016, 5:20 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/colle
ge-football/news/10-ways-college-athletes-can-get-paid-and-remain-eligible-for-their-sport/
(“The NCAA allows players to have paying jobs. They may rarely have the time to do so, but it is
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This idea of a subpar education as compensation for excessive
work hours is one of the past. California citizens have voted in support
of Senate Bill 206 (“SB 206”), which gives college athletes the right
to their name and likeness.13 While a small step, it is one that
represents a drastic change in public policy and the public’s outlook
on amateurism and employment law. SB 206 is intended as the first
step towards compensation for the employment-like conditions of
high-performing college athletes.14 While it does not go far enough,
nor does it protect the students from other potential exploitation, it is
a step in the right direction to remedy employment issues of high-level
athletes.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS
To understand the issues surrounding SB 206’s conception and
its continued problems, the history of the NCAA, Scholarships, and
amateurism must be understood and explored. The NCAA and affiliate
organizations have created a world where athletes dedicate themselves
to an amateur career void of compensation.15 Compensation, as
referred to for collegiate athletes, is an intricate term with debatable
meaning. Amateurism has incorrectly labelled “compensation” as a
dirty word.16 The landscape is simple—scholarships are coveted by
young athletes and the NCAA and universities use them as a guise of
protection.17 In reality, those in charge are seeing extreme profit, while
those they pretend to protect, student athletes, are exploited.18 This
section highlights the NCAA’s massive control over young athletes,
along with the actual meaning, both socially and legally, behind
college scholarships and athletic compensation.
A comprehensive understanding of such topics is inherently
necessary to understand the legal atmosphere of collegiate athletics.
Without such background, it is impossible to understand the courts’

permitted if the work is performed at an amount comparable to the going rate in that area for similar
services.”).
13. S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
14. CAL. S., HISTORY OF SENATE BILL NO. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
15. See generally Schwarz, supra note 6 (finding college athletes are being exploited because
most athletes will not go on to make money playing sports after college).
16. David A. Grenardo, The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confessions of a
Former College Athlete Turned Law Professor, 95 OR. L. REV. 223, 237 (2016).
17. Id.
18. Id.

(13) 54.3_ROSENBLUM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

988

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/13/21 7:46 PM

[Vol. 54:985

rulings or lack thereof regarding amateurism laws, and the future
direction they may take.
A. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
The NCAA website states, “the NCAA was founded in 1906 to
protect young people from the dangerous and exploitive athletics
practices of the time.”19 This statement, asserting a protective, almost
parental NCAA, shows a noble organization. While the organization
came into existence for seemingly important reasons, the statement
also foreshadows the organization’s modern issues. Before the
NCAA’s formation, schools wrestled with the same issues we face
today.20 Competitiveness, commercialization, and the need for safety
mechanisms plagued college sports. “[T]he commercialization and
propensity to seek unfair advantages existed virtually from the
beginning of organized intercollegiate athletics in the United States.
The problem of cheating, which was no doubt compounded by the
increasing commercialization of sport, was a matter of concern.”21
The association was created during a dark time for college
football as they faced abolition.22 During the 1905 season, eighteen
amateur players died during games, causing public outcry for the
implementation of safety procedures.23 Luckily for the sport, thenPresident Theodore Roosevelt called together meetings at the White
House to enact safety reform.24 This movement would morph into the
NCAA, and later a multi-billion-dollar industry.25 It resulted in an
organization intent on keeping young athletes safe with a heavy hand
of control.26 Now, the NCAA does anything but protect students, and
California lawmakers are looking towards a new reality with SB 206.
19. Dan Treadway, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/johnny-manziel-ncaa-eligibility_b_3020985
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200810230707/https://www.huffpost.com/entry/johnny-manzielncaa-eligibility_b_3020985].
20. Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role
in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 11 (2000).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 12.
23. Id.
24. Janie Harris, President’s Day: A Look at U.S. Presidents in College Sports, NCAA
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2017-02-20/presidents-day-look-uspresidents-college-sports.
25. See id.
26. See What Is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa101/what-ncaa (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
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Today, the NCAA acts as a private, nonprofit, unincorporated
association with 1,1000 member institutions separated into three
divisions (Division I, Division II, and Division III).27 The association
votes on new rules and regulations drafted yearly.28 The NCAA
“prides itself on promotion of collegiate athletics and has a primary
goal of promoting amateurism.”29 This association was created on
what some may think are noble values, with an idea of upholding sport
and competition in a safe environment. But the present-day NCAA
and athletic world is still dealing with the initial problem plaguing its
conception: exploitation.30
This generational issue of the exploitation of athletes is
compounded by the big business of sports. To clarify, sports has
become a “big business” in its profitable expertise and its economic
make-up.31 The NCAA and its university affiliates are essentially an
“economic group consisting of large profit-making corporations.”32
They exert power and influence over social and political policy.
According to the association’s audited financial statement, the
NCAA had close to $1.1 billion in annual revenue during its 2017
fiscal year.33 Seventy-five percent of the NCAA’s annual revenue,
nearly one billion dollars, comes from March Madness. 34 “In 2010[,]
the NCAA signed a fourteen-year, $10.8 billion contract with CBS
Sports and Turner Broadcasting. . . . The deal was extended in April
2016 for . . . [an additional] $8.8 billion that will keep the tournament
on the[] networks until 2032.”35 Approximately 96 percent of the
27. See Our Three Divisions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
28. Zachary Bock, Student-Athletes as Employees: Unmasking Athletic Scholarships, 36 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 131, 136–37 (2016).
29. Id. at 137.
30. See Schwarz, supra note 6.
31. Big Business, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
big%20business (last updated Jan. 7, 2021) (“[A]n economic group consisting of large profitmaking corporations especially with regard to their influence on social or political policy.”).
32. Id.
33. Cameron, supra note 1.
34. Id.; Darren Rovell, NCAA Tops $1 Billion in Revenue During 2016–17 School Year, ESPN
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/22678988/ncaa-tops-1-billionrevenue-first.
35. Jim Smith, March Madness: An “Experiential Commodity” with Money for the Men, Only
Fame for the Women, and an Illusion for the Fans, HUM. SCI. INST. (Mar. 24, 2019),
https://humanscienceinstitute.org/blog/march-madness-an-experiential-commodity-with-moneyfor-the-men-only-fame-for-the-women-and-an-illusion-for-the-fans/; Rodger Sherman, The
NCAA’s New March Madness TV Deal Will Make Them a Billion Dollars a Year, SBNATION

(13) 54.3_ROSENBLUM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

990

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/13/21 7:46 PM

[Vol. 54:985

money the NCAA collects flows to the Division I membership
immediately.36 “It’s the only system in place that assigns a monetary
value based on athletic performance”; despite that, none of the money
is paid to the athletes participating.37
Additionally, “NCAA executives profit greatly” as “the President
of the NCAA reportedly made $1.9 million in 2014, and a number of
other NCAA executives reportedly made over $4 million each.”38
These exuberant numbers “would not arise without the labor provided
by college athletes.”39
This notion of collecting billions of dollars from Division I
membership and reallocating it to sources irrelevant to such members
is a policy cornerstone driving SB 206. The NCAA sees massive
profits, while the young students driving such profits receive
compensation only in the form of college scholarship.
B. Amateurism
The NCAA protects and upholds an ideal that separates the
college athlete from that of a professional: amateurism. The hotly
debated notion is the basis for how student athletes are regulated and
educated.
The NCAA provides a platform for member institutions to
design their athletic programs to be an integral part of the
educational program. Further, the NCAA establishes that it
is necessary to have a clear line of demarcation between
college athletes and professional sports in order to preserve
the student in the student-athlete.40
At its roots, amateurism was created to protect young,
unprofessional athletes.41 However, politicians and athletes debate that
while noble and necessary, its practices no longer accomplish such

(Apr. 12, 2016, 5:06 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2016/4/12/11415764/
ncaa-tournament-tv-broadcast-rights-money-payout-cbs-turner.
36. Tim Parker, How Much Does the NCAA Make off March Madness?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031516/how-much-does-ncaamake-march-madness.asp; Finances of Intercollegiate Athletics, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/ab
out/resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
37. Parker, supra note 36.
38. Grenardo, supra note 16, at 237.
39. Id.
40. Bock, supra note 28, at 159.
41. Sheetz, supra note 2, at 871.
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goals.42 “The Oxford English Dictionary defines amateur as ‘one who
cultivates anything as a pastime, as distinguished from one who
prosecutes it professionally.’”43
The Olympics were once an amateur event, wholly dedicated to
the idea of “no-pay-for-play,” as today’s NCAA. Many historians
theorize amateurism was intended to keep poor classes from
interfering with wealthy sportsmanship.44 “Sports historian Allen
Guttmann explains that in its earliest institution, rules of amateurism
were invented by the Victorian middle and upper classes to exclude
the ‘lower orders’ from the play of the leisure class.”45 “Classism ruled
the sports and athletic activities practiced by the gentry, not only to
prevent the mingling of the higher echelons with the common masses,
but because many of the elite insisted that the ‘plebeians’ had no
concept of sportsmanship and fair play.”46 The classic notion of
amateurism is deeply rooted in limiting participation to those “who
did not receive any financial compensation for his or her athletic
endeavors.”47 The conglomeration of personal wealth kept amateurism
alive.48 This begs the question: How is a system, deeply rooted in
wealth discrimination, alive and well today?
The answer to that question is found in the world of college
athletes. Centuries later, financially poor athletes are prohibited from
earning wealth off their talent. The Olympics remedied this issue in
1960 when the International Olympic Committee pushed to include
professional athletes in the game.49 Critics believed that including
professional athletes would sink the entirety of the Olympic games.50
Simply, society proffered the end of amateurism as the end of
competitive spirit and Olympic viewership. Somehow, critics equated
amateurism with Olympic viewership and sportsmanship.

42. See id. at 873.
43. L.A. Jennings, For Love or for Money: A History of Amateurism in the Olympic Games,
VICE (June 7, 2016, 11:25 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvaqdm/for-love-or-for-moneya-history-of-amateurism-in-the-olympic-games.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See Patrick Hruby, The Olympics Show Why College Sports Should Give Up on
Amateurism, ATLANTIC (July 25, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/
07/the-olympics-show-why-college-sports-should-give-up-on-amateurism/260275/.
50. Id.
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Even Avery Brundage, the International Olympic Committee
president from 1952–1972 and a staunch supporter of preserving
amateurism in the Olympics, said in 1955: “We can only rely on the
support of those who believe in the principles of fair play and
sportsmanship embodied in the amateur code in our efforts to prevent
the games from being used by individuals, organizations or nations for
ulterior motives.”51
Despite the critics, the exact opposite occurred, and the naysayers
were silenced as viewership increased and the masses gathered to
watch sport.52 There was an “influx of individual trust funds to help
support amateur athlete competitors in non-traditional sports such as
skiing. It opened the door for runners and others to accept prize
money, sponsorships and endorsements to fund their training.”53
Athletes earned money, while viewers tuned in at much higher rates
to watch their favorite professionals.54 It even led to incredibly
“impactful sports moments and teams, such as the fabled USA’s men’s
basketball ‘Dream Team’ in 1992.”55
C. Scholarships and the Life of Athletes
1. The Guise of an NCAA Scholarship
Student athlete scholarships are the bread and butter to the NCAA
and its associated universities’ promotion of amateurism. According
to the NCAA, full grant-in-aid or scholarships is “financial aid that
consists of tuition and fees, room and board, books, and other expenses
related to attendance at the institution up to the cost of attendance” set
to a limit by the association.56 On the surface, a student-athlete
scholarship provides aid and opportunity to those who have honed
their sport to a collegiate level. A simple look at the NCAA’s
description of scholarship reveals a seemingly altruistic and beneficial
practice. They boast:

51. Ross Andrews, Push to Allow Professional Athletes Took Hold in 1968 Olympic Games,
GLOB. SPORT MATTERS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://globalsportmatters.com/mexico/2018/10/15/profe
ssional-athletes-1968-olympic-games.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Bock, supra note 28, at 140.
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NCAA Divisions I and II schools provide more than $3.6
billion in athletics scholarships annually to more than
180,000 student-athletes. . . . Full scholarships cover tuition
and fees, room, board and course-related books. Most
student-athletes who receive athletics scholarships receive an
amount covering a portion of these costs. Many studentathletes also benefit from academic scholarships, NCAA
financial aid programs such as the NCAA Division I StudentAthlete Opportunity Fund and need-based aid such as
Federal Pell Grants.57
Other entities describe scholarships similarly. Most common,
definitions circle around the idea of helping student-athletes.
Merriam-Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary defines scholarship as “an
amount of money that is given by a school, an organization, etc., to a
student to help pay for the student’s education.”58 The Oxford
Dictionary defines scholarship as “a grant or payment made to support
a student’s education, awarded on the basis of academic or other
achievement.”59 Moreover, the Cambridge Dictionary defines
scholarship as “an amount of money given by a school, college,
university, or other organization to pay for the studies of a person with
great ability but little money.”60
These definitions and the NCAA promote a “a college education”
above wealth acquisition and sport.61 It is purported to be “the most
rewarding benefit of the student-athlete experience.”62 The ideals
behind this notion are obvious: scholarships intend to benefit a student
“(whether an undergraduate or a graduate) at an educational institution
to aid in the pursuit of his or her studies.”63
Notably, a large amount of NCAA “distributions are made based
on athletic success; they are not typically provided based on
57. Scholarships, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/scholarships (last
visited Feb. 21, 2021).
58. Scholarship, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.learnersdict
ionary.com/definition/scholarship (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
59. Scholarship, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/scholarship (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
60. Scholarship, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/scholarship (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
61. See Scholarships, supra note 57.
62. Id.
63. Publication 970 (2019), Tax Benefits for Education, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
publications/p970/ch01.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2020).
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graduation rates or on academic performance of the schools and their
athletes. This seems counterintuitive given the NCAA’s purported
primary goal of education for its athletes.”64 If this weren’t enough to
show the NCAA’s and affiliate universities’ disinterest with academic
support, games are frequently on weekdays, a seemingly
counterproductive notion if universities want their students to attend
class prepared.65
By definition, athletes should be receiving fair compensation in
the form of education. But, in reality, we find that students are often
left desolate, their talent and energy wasted on four grueling years.
During these four years, high-level athletes receive very little
education and absolutely no profit.
2. The Life of a College Athlete
The above section outlined factual examples of what a studentathlete scholarship is intended to accomplish. By definition, the
studies of a college athlete come first, and their educational
“compensation” would provide them with the means to adequately
live and learn. This means that academic compensation fairly provides
for the requisite athletic performance given by these athletes to their
schools. Scholarships are considered payment for such performance.66
However, the pursuit of academia while under scholarship does not
always play out as intended. This section highlights the oxymoron of
athletic compensation. Many students receive an academic scholarship
that provides them with very little time for academics and very few
resources to pursue academics.67
The root problem behind athletic compensation is highlighted by
both the lifestyle of a collegiate athlete and the monetary value behind
their play. Students on collegiate teams must remain amateurs,
prohibited from receiving outside compensation for their athleticism.68
This poses a huge issue for every type of Division I athlete, those with
and without full scholarships.
Young, aspiring athletes typically fantasize about joining the
ranks of these collegiate athletes. Scholarship opportunities are the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Grenardo, supra note 16.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See infra Section III.B, on how this has changed due to SB 206.
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goal for many. However, the glamorous façade circling college
student-athletes is starkly different from the reality.69 Issues quickly
arise as the cost of living exceeds expectations, schoolwork overloads,
and work opportunities are absent.70 Nicole Sung-Jereczek, a
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) rower spoke out
regarding the formidable commitment of college sports.71 She said that
she “didn’t expect or anticipate the amount of time that [she] would
have to devote to it”72 and was shocked on the limits her commitment
imposed.73 She was not able to get a part-time job or internship.74
Sung-Jereczak’s issue with college sports is just the tip of the iceberg
and does not represent a minority.75
An “NCAA survey found that a typical NCAA athlete in-season
spends 39 hours a week on academics—and 33 hours a week on
sports.”76 Many student athletes describe their time representing a
university as all-consuming.77 The numbers circling the life of a
college athlete take ambiguity away from the problem of amateurism.
In fact, they highlight exactly why it is a failing system.
Roughly “70,000 student-athletes . . . attend[] a university or
college without paying for the cost of attendance. Still, the NCAA
reported that there was approximately 173,500 student-athletes that
participated in Division I athletics.”78 That totals an “astonishing
103,500 student-athletes who . . . pay[] . . . a portion of their [tuition]
at an NCAA member institution.”79 This number should surprise
many, as these students must pay the incredibly high cost of
attendance, while unable to make money. In a 2015 study, the average
annual cost of attendance (not including personal costs or
transportation) for a full-time enrollment at a four-year degree
institution was $34,031 out-of-state and $19,548 in-state.80 That
69. See Kelley Holland, Think Athletic Scholarships Are a ‘Holy Grail’? Think Again, CNBC
(Oct. 13, 2014, 6:02 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/13/think-athletic-scholarships-are-aholy-grail-think-again.html.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Bock, supra note 28, at 142.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 144 (including the cost of “tuition, fees, and room and board”).
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means that 103,500 students are paying tens of thousands of dollars to
essentially work full time at universities.
Even those who receive a full-scholarship for tuition, room,
board, and books must pay “generally between $2000 and $5000 per
year more than the value of respective school’s athletic scholarship.”81
The full cost of attendance fees “include[] a tuition fee, miscellaneous
personal expenses, transportation, loan origination fee and
administrative fees.”82 These extra fees can be so crippling to students
that they go hungry. For example, in 2014, a basketball player from
Connecticut told the media that he often went to bed hungry.83
In actuality, a total of seventy-two hours dedicated to sports and
practice is well over a full-time job. One might ask: Why would an
eighteen-year-old dedicate such extreme hours? If the answer is to
obtain a scholarship to play at a university, the numbers do not
correlate with the time commitment.
III. EXISTING LAW
Recently, critics of amateurism have gained attention, prevailing
in a decades long fight within the California legislature. SB 206 passed
in California, giving student-athletes the right to profit on their name
and likeness. 84 This bill starkly contrasts with the pre-existing
landscape of college sports, disallowing any monetary gain for
collegiate athletes. Despite the groundbreaking nature of this bill,
steep impediments remain to the financial freedom of student-athletes.
This section details California employment law, relevant Ninth Circuit
cases, and the details of SB 206, the Fair Pay to Play Act.
A. Employment Law
To decide if someone is an employee, common law applies a
“right to control” test, which asks whether the person to whom service
is rendered has the “right to control the manner and means of
accomplishing the result desire.”85 Additionally, courts consider nine
factors when deciding whether an individual is an employee in the
eyes of the law: (1) “right to discharge at will, without cause”; (2)
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Grenardo, supra note 16, at 244.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 228.
See S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
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“whether the one performing [the] services is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business”; (3) “the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction
of the principal or by a specialist without supervision”; (4) “the skill
required in the particular occupation”; (5) “whether the principal or
the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work”; (6) “the length of time for which the
services are to be performed”; (7) “method of payment, whether by
the time or by the job”; (8) “whether” or not the work is part of the
regular business of the principal”; and (9) “whether or not the parties
believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.”86
These individual factors “cannot be applied mechanically as separate
tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular
combinations.”87 However, this test does not apply when determining
employment status for the purpose of compliance with California
wage orders.88
In California, the plain language of the California Labor Code
§ 3351 codifies the test set forth in S.G. Borello & Sons v. Department
of Industrial Relations.89 Section 3351 states that an “‘[e]mployee’
means every person in the service of an employer under any
appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied,
oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.”90 There are
a number of exceptions to section 3351 of California Labor Code.91
Of note, California Labor Code § 3352(a)(7) exempts student-athletes
from this definition of an employee and the corresponding protections
that come with it.92 California Labor Code § 3352(a)(7) excludes from
the category of employee, “[a] person . . . participating in sports or
athletics who does not receive compensation for the participation other
than the use of athletic equipment, uniforms, transportation, travel,
meals, lodgings, or other expenses incidental thereto.”93
This exception is the crux of inequitable treatment for athletes.
Federal courts have incorrectly failed to apply the meaning of an
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. (quoting Germann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 176 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871 (1981)).
See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35 (Cal. 2018).
769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
See, e.g., id. § 3352(a)(7).
See id.
Id.
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employee to athletes by pin-pointing their behavior under an exception
to the statute. Yet, the true nature of their activity exactly tracks the
conduct described in the statute. In reality, an exemption applies to
uphold amateurism and to keep academic compensation alive. This
Note dives into the court’s incorrect application, and how SB 206 turns
this exception on its head.
B. SB 206
Prior to the passing of SB 206, the
Student Athlete Bill of Rights, require[d] intercollegiate
athletic programs at [four]-year private universities or
campuses of the University of California or the California
State University that receive, as an average, $10,000,000 or
more in annual revenue derived from media rights for
intercollegiate athletics to comply with prescribed
requirements relating to student athlete rights.94
This Bill of Rights sets forth provisions that ensure coaches are welltrained in safety and health care, that student athletes have a safe
playing environment, and that emergency action plans are in place.95
Such plans and requirements provide that
California’s Pac-12 colleges, which are flush with new TV
revenue, . . . provide continuing education for players on
teams with graduation rates below 60%, pay for sportsrelated medical expenses, cover medical coverage premiums
for low income student-athletes, improve workout safety to
avoid preventable deaths, provide financial and life skills
workshops, and guarantee student-athletes the same due
process rights that are given to regular students.96
The Bill of Rights states that post-secondary student-athletes have
the right to “receive an equivalent scholarship” from the university if
they lose their athletic scholarship due to injury, attend a “financial
and life skills workshop” in their first and third years, and have “the

94. S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
95. See California Governor Signs NCPA Student-Athletes Bill of Rights!, NAT’L COLL.
PLAYERS ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.ncpanow.org/news/releases-advisories/californiagovernor-signs-ncpa-student-athletes-bill-of-rights.
96. Id.
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same rights as other students with regard to any and all matters related
to possible adverse or disciplinary actions.”97
UCLA football players submitted a signed letter of support for SB
1525.98 UCLA football player Jeff Locke stated,
The passing of the California Student-Athletes Bill of Rights
into law is a huge step in the right direction for securing basic
protections for college athletes in California. Along with the
work of Senator Padilla, his staff, and the NCPA, support
among current student-athletes at UCLA was key to gaining
support for this bill. I hope that college athletes and
lawmakers in other states become aware of the protections
that were secured for student-athletes by this bill, and they
take the steps necessary to get a similar bill passed in their
state.99
While these protections go far to protect basic rights of students,
Californians did not think they went far enough. The existing law
failed to account for the exuberant profit of schools off of their athletes
and the corresponding monetary needs of these athletes. The law
helped to keep athletes physically healthy and guarantee them basic
rights. But it barely touched on most basic rights, leaving athletes
without the means to provide for themselves. Simply, “NCAA rules
strictly prohibit athletes from profiting in any way from their
sports.”100
In February of 2019, California state senators Nancy Skinny and
Steven Bradford took on a question that has so obviously plagued
sports for decades. Skinny and Bradford “unveiled SB 206,” which
was aimed “to aid the majority of full-scholarship college athletes,
lift[] them out of poverty, provide support in managing academic
course load[,] and incentiviz[e] student-athletes to complete their

97. S.B. 1525, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67452
(Deering 2021)).
98. See California Governor Signs NCPA Student-Athletes Bill of Rights!, supra note 95.
99. Id.
100. A Quick Snapshot of 3 Things that California SB 206 Does, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019,
9:18 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-30/la-me-college-athletes-pay-sb206-newsom-text-bill.
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undergraduate degrees before transitioning to professional
leagues.”101 SB 206 is also known as The Fair Pay to Play Act.102
The support for The Fair Pay to Play Act skyrocketed as it gained
massive social media attention.103 The Act garnered bipartisan support
and was approved in the California Senate on a thirty-one to four
vote.104 Later, the Act was “unanimously approved by the state
Assembly by a 72-0 vote.”105
The landmark bill “will prohibit the NCAA from barring a
university from competition if its athletes are compensated for the use
of their name, image or likeness beginning in 2023.”106 The legislature
wrote:
[SB 206 prohibits] California postsecondary educational
institutions except community colleges, and every athletic
association, conference, or other group or organization with
authority over intercollegiate athletics, from providing a
prospective intercollegiate student athlete with compensation
in relation to the athlete’s name, image, or likeness, or
preventing a student participating in intercollegiate athletics
from earning compensation as a result of the use of the
student’s name, image, or likeness or obtaining professional
representation relating to the student’s participation in
intercollegiate athletics.107
In addition to allowing student-athletes to control and the ability
to gain revenue for their own name, likeness, and image, the bill allows
professional representation for student athletes. This representation,
often an agent or lawyer, must be “from persons licensed by the

101. Veronica Fernandez De Soto, A Breakdown of SB 206, Which Allows Student-Athletes to
Monetize Their Likenesses, DAILY BRUIN: THE QUAD (Oct. 16, 2019, 6:25 PM),
https://dailybruin.com/2019/10/16/the-quad-a-breakdown-of-sb-206-which-allows-studentathletes-to-monetize-their-likenesses; Press Release, Nancy Skinner, State Senator of California,
Senator Nancy Skinner Announces “The Fair Pay to Play Act” (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20190205-senator-nancy-skinner-announces-“-fair-pay-play-act”.
102. LeBron Rallies Support for Fair Pay to Play Bill, ESPN (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27543413/lebron-rallies-support-fair-pay-playbill.
103. Id. (referencing a tweet from LeBron James advocating for SB 206 that received over
100,000 likes).
104. Fernandez De Soto, supra note 101.
105. Id.
106. A Quick Snapshot of 3 Things That California SB 206 Does, supra note 100.
107. S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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state.”108 Athletic agents must comply with federal law when working
with student athletes.
Further, SB 206 prohibits post-secondary schools from revoking
a student’s athletic scholarship as a result of him or her earning
compensation or obtaining legal representation. Nevertheless, the bill
prohibits a student athlete from entering into compensation contracts
that include provisions that are in conflict with any provision of the
athlete’s team contract.109 Additionally, the bill provides that a team
contract cannot prevent the commercialized purpose of a student
athlete’s name, image, or likeness when they are not engaged in
official team activities.110
When SB 206 becomes operative, a student’s scholarship cannot
be revoked because they choose to seek compensation for use of their
name, image, or likeness. However, a student-athlete will be
prohibited from receiving compensation if their contract for
compensation conflicts with a provision of an athlete’s contract with
the athletic team. In accordance with the legislative purpose of the bill,
SB 206 states that a team contract cannot prevent a student athlete
from receiving compensation for their name, image, or likeness for a
commercial activity unrelated to official team activities.111
SB 206 and its provisions become operative on January 1, 2023
for California student-athletes.112 The bill requires “the Chancellor of
the California Community Colleges to convene a community college
athlete name, image, and likeness working group composed of
individuals appointed on or before July 1, 2020.”113 Additionally, this
working group must
review various athletic association bylaws and state and
federal laws regarding a college athlete’s use of the athlete’s
name, image, and likeness for compensation . . . [and]
submit to the Legislature and the California Community
College Athletic Association a report containing its findings
and policy recommendations in connection with this
review114
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(c)(2) (Deering 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
Id. § 67456(e)(1).
Id. § 67456(f).
Id.
Id. § 67456.
S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
Id.
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SB 206 represents a massive shift in California public policy from
strict amateurism to a sort of gray area, calling for a fairer,
compensated athletic environment. This gray area surfaces as the
oxymoron of a student-athlete is brought to light: they are not
considered employees but now have the opportunity to make money
in a small sector of their livelihood. The exploitation by schools
remains, but now student-athletes can find compensation from outside
their university. Additionally, this gray area rears its head when prior
case law is highlighted. This bill, in essence, supersedes prior case law
that affirmed the nonexistent rights of collegiate athletes. This bill
turns our understanding of traditional amateurism on its head, shifting
California public policy. In turn, the courts must shift their rulings and
develop a new outlook on past California cases.
C. Case Law
Case law surrounding the issue of student-athlete compensation
is sparse but insightful as to public policy before SB 206 was enacted.
According to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the NCAA is a regulatory
body and does not act as an employer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.
§ 203. In Dawson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,115 the
court held that the former college football player failed to state a claim
for relief against the NCAA or the conference for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).116 The court relied on the “California
Legislature’s decision to except student-athletes from workers
compensation benefits and decisions of the California Courts of
Appeal that interpret the student-athlete exception.”117
The Dawson plaintiff had very little room for argument as
California law, prior to Senate Bill 2076, was fairly specific as to the
role of employers in collegiate athletics.118 They upheld the district
court, finding that the Division I college football player was not an
employee of the NCAA and the PAC-12 Conference within the
meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), because “the NCAA and
PAC-12 were regulatory bodies, not employers, of student-athletes
under the FLSA,” as NCAA regulations limiting scholarships did not
create any expectation of compensation, neither the NCAA nor the
115.
116.
117.
118.

932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id. at 911.
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PAC-12 had the power to fire or hire the player, and there was no
evidence that the NCAA rules were conceived or carried out to evade
the law, and further, the revenue generated by college sports did not
convert the relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA into
an employment relationship.119 Additionally, “[t]he player’s
California law claims were properly dismissed because under the
California Labor Code, student-athletes were not employees of the
NCAA/PAC-12.”120
This inability to bring a lawsuit for employee status within the
Ninth Circuit inhibits the rights of student athletes. Recently, in Berger
v. NCAA,121 a former soccer player Samantha Sackos filed a complaint
against the NCAA and its member schools alleging violations of the
FLSA because the NCAA failed to pay college athletes for hours
worked while practicing and playing college sports.122 Though this
case was heard in the Southern District of Indiana, it gives insight as
to the possibility of allowing standing for student-athletes.123
Following holdings of courts nationwide, the Berger court held that
the student-athletes failed to state a claim because student athletes are
not employees according to the law.124 Additionally, the court found
that the student-athletes did not have standing to sue the NCAA, but
they did have standing to sue the individual university in question.125
The court noted that the “students at Penn who choose to
participate in sports—whether NCAA sports, club sports, or
intramural sports—as part of their educational experience do
so because they view it as beneficial to them,” and that “the
existence of thousands of unpaid college athletes on college
campuses each year is not a secret and yet the Department of
Labor has not taken any action to apply the FLSA to them.”
As a result[,] the court found that “the fact that the Plaintiffs

119. Id. at 909–11.
120. MICHAEL J. KILLEEN, EMPLOYMENT IN WASHINGTON: A GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND PRACTICES § 8-3[a] (4th ed. 2020).
121. 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016).
122. Id. at 289; Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate
Student-Athlete and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 287, 296–97 (2016) (explaining that Samantha Sackos initiated the lawsuit but withdrew from
the case, making Gillian Berger, Lauren Anderson, and Taylor Hennig the new named plaintiffs).
123. See Berger, 843 F.3d at 289.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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participate in an NCAA athletic team at Penn does not make
them employees of Penn for FLSA purposes.”126
This reasoning is one that is also shared by the California Courts.
There is no way to uphold amateurism if we deem student-athletes as
employees. However, as will be later detailed, this is an outdated way
of classification, expressly tied to a dying principle SB 206 overrules.
SB 206 could represent a legislative change in policy that may
proliferate future remedies for this California hurdle.
Similar issues in the courts are impacted by SB 206. In 2009,
athletes garnered a modest victory in response to the NCAA’s
“unwillingness to share revenue with . . . student-athlete[s].”127 This
case does not directly concern the FLSA, but it alludes to the impact
by SB 206 and payment to student-athletes.
In that 2009 case, Ed O’Bannon, a former basketball player,
found a digital version of himself on a video game and sued the
NCAA.128 O’Bannon never received compensation for the video game
representation and argued in his lawsuit that the NCAA violated
federal antitrust law by not allowing student-athletes to profit from
their likeness in broadcasts and video games.129
The California district court ruled that the NCAA violated the
Sherman Act by “not allowing the student-athletes to share in the
revenue generated from their names, images, and likenesses.”130
However, the ruling was partially overturned on appeal as the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the Sherman Act violation but found issue with
athletic compensation. This notion of payment, and a lack thereof, is
what keeps student-athletes amateurs.
The Ninth Circuit echoed the Supreme Court’s language that
it “must afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend
college athletics.” Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reveled on the
importance of amateurism in NCAA history and found there
to be a quantum leap between offering student-athletes
education-related compensation and offering deferred cash

126. Epstein & Anderson, supra note 122, at 297 (quoting Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845, 857 (S.D. Ind. 2016)).
127. Bock, supra note 28, at 161.
128. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963, 970 (N.D. Cal.
2014), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
129. Id. at 963.
130. Bock, supra note 28, at 161 (citing O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007).
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payments that were not, in any way, connected to educational
expenses. 131
This ruling theorizes there would be “no basis for returning to a
rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point,” if the NCAA
paid athletes for expenses unrelated to their academic pursuits.132
The key in this case was the difference between sport and
education-related compensation and offering deferred cash payments
that are unconnected to educational expenses. As a result of this ruling,
NCAA member schools are now allowed to offer stipends to cover the
full cost of attendance.133 However, that number “is capped at $500 a
month, which some argue is a meager sum.”134
Courts outside of California have ruled on the workers
compensation as related to athletics. The California courts are not the
only court to rule in favor of upholding amateurism despite the
difficulties student athletes at top schools face. Three other wellknown and more recent football related decisions from Michigan,
Indiana, and Texas secure that student-athletes were not entitled to
worker’s compensation.
In Rensing, the Indiana Supreme Court found no evidence of
an employer-employee relationship. In Coleman, the
Michigan Court of Appeals opined that there was no
employment contract between the university and the studentathlete. Finally, in Waldrep, the Texas Court of Appeals
emphasized that there . . . was no intent on the part of Texas
Christian University (TCU) or football player Kent Waldrep
that his scholarship should constitute payment for his football
services, thereby not creating an employer-employee
relationship that would fall under worker’s compensation
statutes.135
These cases represent a line of thought paralleling a pre-SB 206
landscape. The court essentially feared a world without amateurism,
131. Id. at 161–62.
132. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015).
133. Mario Koran, ‘Game Changer’: Inside the Fight to End Exploitation of Athletes at US
Colleges, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2019 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/oct/
04/ncaa-california-law-pay-student-athletes-colleges.
134. Id.
135. Epstein & Anderson, supra note 122, at 294; Rensing v. Ind. St. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444
N.E. 2d 1170 (Ind. 1983); Coleman v. Western Mich. Univ., 336 N.W. 2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983); Waldrep v. Tex. Emps. Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000).
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as those did prior to the 1960 Olympic Conferences. All of these cases
stem from a time before SB 206. The bill represents a drastic shift from
case law that obviously overrides the past California case law
inhibiting student athletic compensation for their name and likeness.
The bill takes a large step in allowing third parties to pay athletes;
however, it is silent on the NCAA and member schools payment in
situations similar to Dawson and O’Bannon.
IV. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW: THREE ISSUES PLAGUE CALIFORNIA
LABOR LAW IN A FAIR PAY TO PLAY ERA
California Labor Law and its underlying dependence on
amateurism faces many issues with the passing of SB 206. This Note
highlights three problems among many: (1) the current California
labor exception for athletes directly contradicts public policy behind
SB 206, and additionally, highlights why student athletes meet a
common law definition of employees; (2) the promotion of
amateurism is outdated and does not align with the actual life of
Division I student athletes; and (3) most student athletes do not have
the ability to play professional sports, thus the NCAA takes away their
only opportunity to capitalize on their own publicity.
A. SB 206 Public Policy Directly Contradicts California Labor Law
and a True Analysis of the “Right to Control” Test for Student
Athletes
This issue is two-fold. First, SB 206 dramatically changed the
landscape for student-athletes.136 It did not simply give them publicity
rights independent from their university, but it additionally proves
Californians do not believe in the age-old adage of amateurism.137
This policy shift, from strict amateurism to compensation, requires
California legislators and courts to take a new look at section
3352(a)(7) of the California Labor Law.138 SB 206 establishes new
policy ideals rendering the existing employment law exception for

136. See generally S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (SB 206 changes the
environment for college athletes in 2023 as the first opportunity they have had to receive
compensation).
137. Michael McCann, Could ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’ Pave Way Toward End of Amateurism in
Collegiate Athletics?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 25, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/
05/25/california-fair-pay-play-act-end-ncaa-amateurism.
138. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(a)(7) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
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college athletes as outdated and plainly unfair. It directly contradicts
with our existing view of amateurism.139
This passing of SB 206 made apparent: Californians believe
athletes deserve more. This idea of athletics evolving from traditional
amateurism follows the same storyline as the 1960 Olympics.
Legislatures no longer believe there should be a hard and fast line
restricting payment for student-athletes. The California Labor Code
exception for athletes follows old ideals that now represent unfair
treatment.140
Second, these same policy concerns that necessitate the court to
reevaluate the Labor Laws also necessitate a reevaluation of the
definition of an employee under common law. The “right of control”
test would ask whether the universities have the right to control the
manner and means of their athletic teams.141 The answer is an
overwhelming yes. The universities hand-pick every detail of their
athlete’s life. Everything from their schedule, clothes, food, payment,
strength, training, coaches, tutors, classes, living arrangement,
equipment, breaks, and sick days are controlled by the university.142
Under common law, there should be no question an arrangement such
as this qualifies as employment.
B. The Outdated Promotion of Amateurism Does Not Align with the
Life of Student Athletes
The life of a student athlete differs greatly from their non-athletic
peers. In reality, many student-athletes have analogized themselves as
slaves to their schools. Seen within their extreme hours, poor
educational compensation, and difficulty staying afloat while
balancing such a lifestyle, amateurism is failing students.143
Most Division I (DI) athletes work extreme hours, much longer
than most employees. It is not uncommon for an athlete to spend well
over forty hours a week training and up to eighty hours.144 Further,
139. See generally Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateuri
sm (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (explaining different situations which might affect a college athlete’s
amateur status).
140. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(a)(7).
141. See Brassinga v. City of Mountain View, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 672 (1998).
142. Bock, supra note 28, at 137; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETE ASS’N, GOALS STUDY OF
THE STUDENT ATHLETE EXPERIENCE INITIAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 2–5 (2016),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/GOALS_2015_summary_jan2016_final_20160627.pdf.
143. See Bock, supra note 28, at 162.
144. Id. at 158 n.167; see Holland, supra note 69.
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these long hours are not rewarded with adequate educational
compensation. Athletes frequently miss class for sporting events and
travel. They are not allowed to attend classes that conflict with their
season games and trainings and are additionally left with very little
time after practice to learn new material. It is a known phenomenon
that athletes are put in easier classes so they can get passing grades
with their busy schedules. They are forced to miss most holidays and
family events. For example, most DI Women’s Basketball players do
not get Thanksgiving breaks like the rest of their peers as they must
play in tournaments.145
It is obvious that amateurism is no longer doing its job. Students
are exploited daily. They work grueling hours but receive no
compensation. SB 206 gives them some means to remedy this
exploitation. It allows athletes to make additional money from outside
sources. This will be the first time they have the ability to buy food,
clothes, and necessities outside of what the school supplies. However,
the bill does nothing to remedy the true offenders of student
exploitation.
The universities are the true offenders. They have left students in
an unfair position. Millions of videos, pictures, and advertisements are
sent out to the world using the likeness of college athletes. The NCAA
and universities make substantial revenue off this media. SB 206 only
addresses the name and likeness from outside sources. While the
universities get rich, the athletes get a subpar education for their hard
work.
C. Most Student Athletes Do Not Have the Opportunity to Capitalize
on Their One Chance for Publicity
Many proponents for amateurism and the small scope of SB 206
call on an athlete’s ability to make massive profits after graduation.
While this is very true for some athletes, it is true for only a small
fraction of athletes. Fewer than 2 percent of college athletes make
professional leagues after graduation.146 Thus, for 98 percent of

145. See, e.g., Mitchell Northam, Viewer’s Guide to Thanksgiving Week in Women’s College
Basketball, NCAA (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-women/article/201911-26/viewers-guide-thanksgiving-week-womens-college-basketball.
146. Angela Farmer, Let’s Get Real with College Athletes About Their Chances of Going Pro,
THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 24, 2019, 6:47 AM), https://theconversation.com/lets-get-real-withcollege-athletes-about-their-chances-of-going-pro-110837.
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college athletes, they have one chance to capitalize on publicity and
athletics.147 Universities take this chance away.
V. PROPOSAL
The age-old adage of mandatory amateurism does not
compliment the lifestyle of modern collegiate athletes. SB 206 makes
a small, important, yet flawed change to the system. Its passing
represents a massive shift in public policy that must be reflected in
California law. Where employment law exempts college athletes from
employment, it simultaneously exempts them from vital labor
protections.148
There are numerous, palatable changes to legislation that can help
protect the mass-exploited collegiate athletes. This Note proposes two.
First, SB 206 should be expanded to allow universities to pay their
athletes for their name and likeness. This would provide all levels of
athletes the ability to support themselves, save, and capitalize on their
college opportunity. A change such as this would allow both
universities and athletes to benefit.
The key to dissuading critics of integrating a salary and publicity
rights into the life of collegiate athletes rests in election—it would not
be mandatory. Salary and payment, unless work hours exceeds that of
their scholarship, would be up to the discretion of the university. This
dissuades what the Atlantic noted as a main critique of collegiate
athlete payment:
Supporters of college sports amateurism often claim that
scrapping the system would be like giving all Americans
equal access to health care: a nice idea, but a legal and fiscal
impossibility. After all, letting student-athletes earn money
means paying them a market wage. Which in turn means
axing currently subsidized campus sports like tennis and
volleyball; fending off inevitable Title IX lawsuits; dealing
with a probable athlete union; possibly saying goodbye to the
NCAA’s all-important federal tax-exempt status. 149
The court incorrectly shared a similar view, “the market for
college football is distinct from other sports markets and must be
‘differentiate[d]’ from professional sports lest it become ‘minor league
147. See id.
148. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(a)(7) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
149. Hruby, supra note 49.
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[football].’”150 What critics fail to see is that amateurism has already
failed. It has failed to such a degree that universities are the ones now
exploiting their athletes. Fixing this flaw would not create more
“minors” as the court proffered, but it would enable the collegiality
and protection of students.
The Olympics doesn’t pay participants. It simply allows
them to get paid. There’s a difference. A difference college
sports should welcome with open arms. . . . [L]et [college
athletes] be like Phelps, appearing in commercials and on the
cover of video games, profiting off their fame and image like
everyone else in America. Including their coaches. Doing so
won’t cost the current college sports industrial complex a
penny of the billions it receives for men’s football and
basketball broadcast rights; if anything, it will help grow and
share the wealth without having to share too much of said
wealth. [Caitlyn] Jenner’s iconic paid appearance on a
Wheaties box was good for the former decathlete and good
for [her] sport; if Brundage’s ghost shed a single Iron Eyes
Cody tear at the rank commercialism of it all, well, boo-hoo.
“Players already endorse products. . . . They already serve as
billboards for the shoe companies. They’re used in video
games. They’re used in lots of way. Schools have fundraisers
where they sign autographs and gear on behalf of the
school.”151
An expansion of SB 206 would simply allow students to reap the
fruits of their labor for activities in which they already participate.
Second, the California Labor Code should simultaneously be
amended to provide student-athletes with the protections of
employees. This does not mean to completely make collegiate athletes
the employees of their universities, but it does require they receive
some benefit for dedicating their time and energy in a manner similar
to an employee. This is not a foreign concept for universities.
Currently, part-time student jobs at university recreational centers,
libraries, and administration are common. This proposal does not even
amount to such a degree.
150. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015)
(alterations in original) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984)).
151. Hruby, supra note 49.
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The California Labor Code exception should be amended to allow
student-athletes to be paid more proportionally for their time. Potential
pay under an employment scheme should be linked to the universities’
overall athletics profits. The DI schools bringing in extreme sums
would have a greater, more stringent payment plan. This would allow
protection for the athletes in more intensive programs, versus the
students who need less protection in lower divisions.
There are many avenues available to determine compensation
where scholarships are involved. Potential determination could
include compensation and protection based on total hours surpassing
the amount of scholarship received. Scholarships amount to a full-time
student athlete, typically twenty-five to forty hours per week of school
and athletics. So, time put in greater than such should be compensated.
Collegiate athletes are the celebrities of their campus, yet there is
a dark underbelly of exploitation and control that few outsiders
witness. SB 206 must be expanded to allow both universities and the
NCAA to pay their athletes for their name and likeness. Additionally,
this clearly dictates a change in public policy calling for a
corresponding change to amateurism. The California Labor Code must
be amended to require high profiting schools with rigorous programs
to compensate and protect their athletes like employees.
VI. CONCLUSION
SB 206 reveals decades of deep-rooted dissent among critics of
academic compensation. Many believe the end of amateurism would
bring about the exploitation of young athletes. But they fail to
acknowledge that young athletes are already facing such exploitation.
They are plagued with an inability to financially support themselves
while playing high-level collegiate sports. Under this rule of law, the
California courts and legislature have always upheld the big business
of collegiate sports above the rights of student-athletes. The NCAA
and their bottomless resources have dominated in numerous cases,
subjugating their athletes as amateurs. SB 206 makes a necessary
change to this traditional view of amateurism, but it does not go far
enough.
With the passing of SB 206, problems remain: the current
California labor exception directly contradicts public policy while
promoting an outdated view of student athletes and undermining their
only opportunity to capitalize on their publicity. This massive shift in
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California public policy must be reflected in other areas of the law,
outside of SB 206. Employment law shields college athletes from a
hope of protection. This Note purports a two-fold solution: SB 206
should be expanded to allow universities to pay their athletes for their
name and likeness and the California Labor Code should allow
student-athletes employee protections. California must protect this
class of young, hardworking, and incredibly talented citizens.

